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about situated stories provide the backdrop for our major
proposition, which is that situated stories are used to
develop and maintain the self. We view self-development
through situated stories as a lifespan process, beginning
in early childhood and extending to old age, and that
process is situated in a larger cultural milieu that holds
expectations of what makes a healthy narrative and a
healthy self. The ideas that stories and self are intimately
linked (e.g., Fivush, 2001; McAdams, 1993, 2001; Singer
& Salovey, 1993; Thorne, 2000) and that stories are sit-
uated (e.g., Bamberg, 2004b; Pasupathi, 2001; Thorne,
2004) have separately received a great deal of atten-
tion in receznt years. In this article, however, we pro-
pose to integrate these two ideas and propose a process
model of how situated stories help people to make connec-
tions between their experiences and their selves. Specifically,
we focus on how stories, such as high points, turning
points, and a favorite Easter Sunday, become part of
the self.
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This article is focused on the growing empirical emphasis
on connections between narrative and self-development.
The authors propose a process model of self-develop-
ment in which storytelling is at the heart of both stabil-
ity and change in the self. Specifically, we focus on how
situated stories help develop and maintain the self with
reciprocal impacts on enduring aspects of self, specifi-
cally self-concept and the life story. This article empha-
sizes the research that has shown how autobiographical
stories affect the self and provides a direction for future
work to maximize the potential of narrative approaches
to studying processes of self-development.
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The universe is made up of stories, not of atoms.
—Rukeyser (1968)
This excerpt from Rukeyser’s poem suggests that, as
humans, our worlds are stories; we are made up of,
engage in, and are surrounded by stories. The impor-
tance of stories is a proposition that is gaining promi-
nence in empirical psychology, and we build on this
trend by proposing a process model of narrative self-
development that has at its heart the study of personal
autobiographical narratives, or situated stories. We use
the term situated stories to emphasize the fact that any
narrative account of personal memory is created within a
specific situation, by particular individuals, for particular
audiences, and to fulfill particular goals. These factsDEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Before we begin, it is crucial to be explicit on three
issues: the definition of self that we employ, our defini-
tion of situated stories, and the relation between situ-
ated stories and the life story model, which we draw on
for our conceptual framework.
1
In terms of the definition of self that we employ, we
focus on two aspects of self: self-concept and the life
story. Self-concept is defined as conscious beliefs about
the self that are descriptive or evaluative (Kernis &
Goldman, 2003; Markus & Wurf, 1987). We review
concepts such as self-esteem, beliefs about one’s skills,
and typicality of self-relevant events as aspects of one’s
self-concept. The second realm of self that we discuss is
the life story. The life story is an extended but selective
autobiography of personal experiences and interpreta-
tions of those experiences that provides unity and pur-
pose to the person (McAdams, 1993). We also include
a brief review of some research on personality, which
tests our questions about the impact of stories in a truly
developmental time scale. We argue that through the
telling of situated stories one develops and maintains
both the life story and self-concept. Throughout the
manuscript we will either use the term self to refer to
both self-concept and the life story together for ease and
because both can operate in tandem or we will specify
to which aspect of self we refer.
Although what we have just described makes for
clearer methodological designs (with self-concept or life
story as the outcome variable), there is, of course, the
question of the relation between these two constructs.
The main question that arises is whether self-concept is
always represented in the life story and whether the life
story is always represented in self-concept. We suggest
that, conceptually, the stories one tells about oneself
represent different aspects of one’s self-concept directly
or indirectly, such as telling a story about when one
behaved uncharacteristically (e.g., Rice & Pasupathi,
2006). In terms of the representation of self-concept in
the life story, we suggest that whereas life stories might
not contain all aspects of one’s self-concept (partly due
to methodological limitations) one should be able to tell
a story to explain one’s beliefs about the self. Without
this kind of storied evidence, others may be less likely to
believe that the characteristic under discussion is indeed a
part of the self. Thus, while we will distinguish between
self-concept and the life story in reviewing the literature
for ease of understanding and for empirical applications
of this model, we acknowledge and address, when neces-
sary, how these constructs are related and when they
work together.
The next definition we must tackle is that of situated
stories, which we define as any narrative account of
personal memory that is created within a specific situ-
ation, by particular individuals, for particular audi-
ences, and to fulfill particular goals.
2 Notably, situated
stories can be created internally or externally; that is, a
story does not have to be told to others for it to be sit-
uated. In defining what is situated about these stories,
we focus on three issues in this article: the production
of situated stories, the maintenance or integration of sto-
ries as part of the self, and the cultural context in which
they are shared.
One reason we focus on situated stories as our unit of
analysis for understanding the self is their ubiquity in
daily life. For example, in a daily diary study in which
people wrote about the most memorable event of the day
and whether it was disclosed, we found that 62% of
those events were already disclosed by the end of the day
on which they occurred (Pasupathi, McLean, & Weeks,
2007). In 15-min conversations on pleasant and unpleas-
ant topics, married couples bring up an average of 9 to
13 specific past events during those 15 minutes
(Pasupathi, Lucas, & Coombs, 2002). Similarly, during
family dinner-table conversations, stories about the past
are brought up once every 5 mins (Bohanek, Marin,
Fivush, & Duke, 2006). This kind of ubiquity goes
beyond everyday storytelling to specifically include emo-
tional and important events. Across cultures, genders,
and types of emotion, 90% of emotional experiences are
disclosed to other people within a few days of their
occurrence (Rimé, Mesquita, Philippot, & Boca, 1991).
Finally, 90% of self-defining memories have been shared
at least once in the past (Thorne, McLean, & Lawrence,
2004). Thus, we have chosen to examine self-development
from the vantage point of one of the most common
behaviors in which humans engage.
We chose to focus on situated stories not only because
of their ubiquity but also because of their hypothesized
relevance to the life story and to self-concept. In terms of
the life story, numerous studies have focused on charac-
teristics of the life story such as themes and coherence
(e.g., Baerger & McAdams, 1999; McAdams, Healy, &
Krause, 1984), but the specific processes by which the
life story develops remain underexamined. Recent the-
oretical contributions have emphasized more process-
oriented ideas about how the life story is constructed. For
example, Habermas & Bluck (2000) introduced the term
autobiographical reasoning to illustrate the dynamic
process of thinking about the past to make links to the
self. The concept of autobiographical reasoning is cen-
trally related to what we review, although we extend
this concept by detailing evidence for the idea that such
reasoning occurs in the construction of situated stories.
We argue that while there are many situated stories and
although, by definition, not all of them are selected into
the life story, some will be. Therefore, beginning with
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the construct of situated stories allows us to look at life-
story development because such stories are potential
candidates for integration into this extended story. In
terms of self-concept, we also review evidence to suggest
that one way to maintain or to change self-conceptions
is to tell stories about the self. Although evidence exists
to support this claim, this conceptual link between situ-
ated storytelling and self-concept has not been clearly
made before, and we emphasize storytelling as a major
process for the development and maintenance of self-
concept (cf. Pasupathi, in press).
Having clarified our definitions of self, situated sto-
ries, and the link between situated stories and the self,
we turn now to our conceptual process model, which is
reflected in Figure 1. The first part of our model, the
arrow going from experience through storying to self,
reflects the novel idea that some situated stories become
part of the way individuals perceive themselves. The
arrow going from self to experience reflects the phe-
nomenon that people bring enduring aspects of them-
selves to the experience of events and to the construction
of situated stories. Thus, one’s self-concept and one’s
currently held life story affect the kinds of experiences
one has and how those experiences are narrated, an
idea on which we elaborate in this article. The central
argument that we want to make, however, concerns the
flow from experience to self. We propose that narratively
induced self change happens through the incremental
telling of situated stories to multiple audiences and in
multiple contexts. It is important that within this process
approach we do not treat narrative as an assessment of
internal representations but rather as an emergent prod-
uct of representations and features of the context in which
narratives are told—in our terms, situated stories (see also
Bamberg, 2004b; Pasupathi, 2001; Thorne, 2004).
To contextualize our framework, we offer a fictional
example of someone we call Laura who experienced the
loss of her mother at age 20. Laura has talked about
that experience many times since it happened 10 years
ago. In her first tellings, Laura’s story was one of vulner-
ability and uncertainty; she was often seeking support
through the telling of her story. Indeed, she was seeking
to shape the story, to find meaning in the loss and coher-
ence in her life. Eventually, Laura developed a story of
her mother’s death that acknowledged the pain of the loss
but incorporated a sense of personal growth: She lost her
mother but she grew stronger as a result. Upon storying
this event, Laura may approach other challenging events
with a new self-concept (she is resilient) and two addi-
tions to her life story: a new event (the loss of her mom)
and a new manner of processing self-information. That
is, she has had practice at storying negative experi-
ences into narratives of personal growth and may do so
again. It is also possible that Laura has certain stable
characteristics, such as openness to experience, which
allow her to more deeply explore the meaning of the
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this article.
We begin by emphasizing how stories can contribute
to stability and change in the self because this is crucial
for our contention that narrative construction is an
engine for self-development. We then, more briefly, con-
sider how enduring aspects of the self contribute to the
way people narrate their experiences. We also discuss
how the cultural contexts in which stories are shared con-
tribute to the construction of situated stories. We then
close by considering questions for future research using
this process model.
SITUATED STORIES AFFECT THE SELF
Our proposal that situated stories affect self-development
across the lifespan is supported by three areas of research.
First, research suggests that situated stories are linked
to the emergence of narrative capacities and styles in
childhood. Second, there is evidence to suggest that
these stories are linked to the emergence of the life
story itself in adolescence and to aspects of self-concept
in childhood and adolescence. Third, situated stories
are linked to change and stability in personality across
adulthood.
The Emergence of Situated Stories
Parent-child reminiscence is one of the first contexts
for children’s developing understanding of the self as
storied (e.g., Fivush, 2001; Harley & Reese, 1999;
Reese, 2002b). Studies of parent-child conversations
focus on the emergence of skills for and different styles
of narrating the past. We focus our review directly on
evidence that points to relations between situated story-
telling and self-concept and on differences in narrative
styles that we hypothesize will best predict autobio-
graphical reasoning processes once the life story becomes
a relevant task in adolescence (e.g., Habermas & Bluck,
2000). Specifically, we focus on characteristics of remi-
niscence styles that emphasize evaluative and emotional
elaboration because these are especially important nar-
rative skills for communicating a good or comprehen-
sible story (Labov & Waletzky, 1967; Newcombe &
Reese, 2004) and because they constitute ways of giv-
ing meaning to past experiences and articulating their
relevance to one’s life story (e.g., Fivush, 2001).
As it happens, parents socialize different patterns of
emotional elaboration and evaluation with their children
(e.g., Fivush, 1991; Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 2006;
Haden & Fivush, 1996; Haden, Haine, & Fivush, 1997;
McCabe & Peterson, 1991; Reese & Fivush, 1993).
Parents who use a high elaborative style provide more
narrative structure for children through the provision of
evaluative comments and questions, offering and eliciting
more information, and being supportive of the child’s
view in the conversation. In contrast, parents with a low
elaborative style tend to repeat questions, switch topics
quickly, and do not elaborate on event details. These
styles of reminiscing are related to the child’s narrative
style concurrently and over time in both shared (with
parents) and independent assessments (with a researcher).
Over time, children with highly elaborative parents
provide more evaluative devices in their own narratives,
even when controlling for earlier narrative skill (e.g.,
Haden et al., 1997; Harley & Reese, 1999; Hudson, 1990;
McCabe & Peterson, 1991). Furthermore, children’s
developing narrative abilities and the parent’s provi-
sion of narrative structure are reciprocally interrelated
over time (Farrant & Reese, 2000). That is, mothers
provide more elaboration as children get older at the
same time as children are supplying more information
themselves. Finally, Peterson, Jesso, and McCabe (1999)
established this relationship as causal by showing that
children of mothers who were trained to be more elab-
orative reported more complex narratives with an
experimenter 2 years later compared to children in a
control group.
These studies show that children learn to construct
situated stories about themselves with differing emphases
on autobiographical reasoning. That is, some parents,
and as a result some children, emphasize evaluative and
emotional information—hallmarks of autobiographical
reasoning. We hypothesize that whether one is elabora-
tive or repetitive in childhood may have consequences
for one’s later life story.
Gender is also related to the elaborative aspects of
reminiscing. Parents are more elaborative with girls,
and girls provide more unique details of past experi-
ence than do boys even when boys and girls are at
similar language levels (Reese & Fivush, 1993). Studies
of late adolescents and adults have shown that females
create more complex narratives than do males
(McLean, 2007), suggesting that these patterns of
interaction may predict the formulation of life-story
events years later.
These gender differences are linked not only to later
life story development but also to emotional self-concept.
Parents have been shown to either minimize emotion
talk or emphasize the pragmatics of managing emotion
with their sons, and they elaborate on the feelings about
an event with their daughters (Chance & Fiese, 1999;
Fivush, 1991); thus, girls are socialized into creating a
more emotional and interpersonal self-concept than are
boys (e.g., Buckner & Fivush, 2000, 2003; Reese &
Fivush, 1993). Indeed, compared to boys, girls report
more discussion of internal states and emotions in their
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with older groups have shown that emotional and rela-
tional self-concepts persist in adolescence and early
adulthood as girls are more likely to tell narratives of
care for others than are boys (Thorne & McLean,
2003). Furthermore, females who have high self-esteem
throughout adolescence, or who increase in self-esteem
during this time, are more likely to have autobiograph-
ical memories in emerging adulthood that are relation-
ally oriented than are those with low or decreasing
self-esteem across adolescence (Thorne & Michaelieu,
1996). Finally, in fully formed life stories, women are
more likely to discuss fear and sadness as well as themes
of communion than are men (e.g., McAdams et al.,
2004; McAdams et al., in press). Thus, self-conceptions
about interpersonal relationships and emotional experi-
ences that are socialized in early childhood manifest in
the themes of life stories in adulthood. This is an
example of the dynamic interaction between self-concept
and life story; that is, the relation between self-concept
and life story may be mediated by storytelling.
Turning to more traditional measures of self-concept,
research has also shown that narrative development is
related to the early development of self-concept. Harley
and Reese (1999) found that both mirror self-recognition
and parental reminiscence styles independently predicted
narrative production concurrently and over time (see
also Welch-Ross, Fasig, & Farrar, 1999). However, the
initial importance of self-recognition to shared and inde-
pendent narrative production was found to be later medi-
ated by maternal reminiscing style at age two (Reese,
2002a). In other words, children who displayed earlier
mirror self-recognition had more elaborative mothers at
age two, and maternal reminiscing style more directly pre-
dicted children’s later narratives than did self-recognition.
Furthermore, in terms of emerging self-concept, Bird and
Reese (2006) found that explanatory talk about nega-
tive events was associated with greater consistency in
children’s self-concept. In interpreting these findings,
Bird and Reese suggested that explaining and resolving
negative events allows children to understand the personal
meaning of these events, thus providing for greater self-
understanding and self-consistency. Therefore, the devel-
opment of self-understanding (both self-concept and
the personal meaning of events) is linked to the social-
ization of autobiographical reasoning processes in sto-
rytelling practices at the earliest stages of narrative
development.
Narrative styles also have consequences for evaluative
aspects of self-concept, such as self-esteem, particularly
in relation to autobiographical reasoning processes.
Specifically, Bohanek et al. (2006) found that parents
who are more expressive and explanatory in talking
about a negative past event with their 9- to 11-year-old
children have children with higher self-esteem 2 years
later compared to parents who are less expressive and
explanatory (cf. Bird & Reese, 2006). Furthermore,
gender differences similar to the work in early childhood
are seen. Specifically, girls who engage in earlier conver-
sations with mothers who are emotionally expressive in
late childhood have high self-esteem in early adoles-
cence. Compared to those with low self-esteem, boys
with fathers who are more explanatory in talking about
negative past events in late childhood consequently have
high self-esteem in early adolescence. It is interesting that
similar predictive validity does not emerge for talk about
positive events, and Bohanek et al. (2006) suggested that
talk about negative past events is particularly important
in understanding self-esteem because children need
expert guidance and scaffolding for dealing with these
events. This is a particularly important proposition
because research on late adolescents and adults, which
we subsequently review, has consistently found that the
kinds of events that are deemed the most personally
meaningful and important are more emotionally nega-
tive (see also Bird & Reese, 2006; Fivush, Hazzard,
Sales, Sarfatti, & Brown, 2003; Sales, Fivush, &
Peterson, 2003). This suggests a link between self-con-
cept and life story development around negative events:
Children who learn autobiographical reasoning skills for
narrating negative events through the construction of sit-
uated stories in late childhood have higher self-esteem in
early adolescence and may also have more elaborated,
integrated life stories in adulthood, which have also been
found to be related to self-esteem (e.g., McAdams,
Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001). Again, we
see how self-concept and the life story operate together
through storytelling.
Overall, research on parent-child reminiscence sug-
gests that the construction of situated stories with val-
ued others is related to early aspects of self-concept,
specifically self-recognition, self-esteem, and emotional
self-concept. Furthermore, the construction of these sto-
ries is related to narrative styles (elaborative or not),
which we suggest will be important to developing a life
story during adolescence. The research on children puts
special emphasis on parents as conarrators in construct-
ing situated stories and less emphasis on other contex-
tual aspects of situated stories, such as goals. Looking
to older age groups, research suggests that these styles
of narration persist, and this research also puts more
emphasis on goals and the kinds of stories that get told.
Emerging and Young Adulthood
As we have detailed, parents are crucial to the con-
struction of situated stories, and we now describe a
related line of work with older samples that also supports
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life story and self-conceptions. In understanding the con-
struction of situated stories and their impact on the self,
we review research on listener behavior, emotional sto-
rytelling, and storytelling goals.
Pasupathi and colleagues have conducted several
studies on how listeners influence storytelling and by
extension autobiographical reasoning processes, using
both experimental and nonexperimental designs. In exper-
imental studies, tellers either share a laboratory-provided
event (experience with a computer game) or a recent
personal past event, and this sharing occurs with a lis-
tener (either a stranger or a friend) who is directed to be
either responsive or distracted. Distracted listeners are
created via a dual task, for example, counting words
beginning with “th.” These studies have shown that lis-
tener behavior changes how elaborative the story is in
the moment of telling, with effects that are evident on
subsequent remembering occasions (Pasupathi & Hoyt,
2007; Pasupathi, Stallworth, & Murdoch, 1998). Dis-
tracted listening appears to lessen the elaborative aspects
of remembering, which as we discussed previously are
important to autobiographical reasoning processes.
Thus, results from both adult and child studies suggest
that autobiographical reasoning appears to be social-
ized and emphasized (or de-emphasized) by the people
with whom we share our stories.
Other recent findings directly examine the mediating
role of creating situated stories for the shaping of self-
conceptions (Pasupathi, Alderman, & Shaw, 2007).
For example, in one study, two friends participated in an
experience involving a computer game. One friend, the
player, played the game while his or her friend observed.
Both were asked to privately assess the player’s skill
level. Then the two jointly told a third party about their
experience playing the game. Although players generally
contributed more information to this conversation, the
more information that observers communicated, the
more they were able to influence the player’s postcon-
versation self-perceived skill. In other words, the act of
telling the story of the game acted as a process by
which friends influenced one another’s self-conceptions
of game-playing skill. Other extensions of this work
emphasize the importance of listeners for shaping self-
conceptions via their role in the creation of situated
stories. For example, people talking to distracted lis-
teners later view the shared memory as less self-typical
or, in the case of an activity like a computer game, as
less interesting (Pasupathi & Rich, 2005; Thoman,
Sansone, & Pasupathi, in press). This research is most
similar to the parent-child research in that it specifically
emphasizes coconstruction of stories and that these
coconstructors influence not only stories but also related
self-conceptions, as in the findings on early adolescent
self-esteem (Bohanek et al., 2006). Such studies are
important as analogues of developmental process on a
microgenetic scale, but clearly more evidence is needed
on how responsive listening continues to play a role in
storytelling and self-development during adulthood. For
example, over time people may quickly turn to other
audiences or change their stories if consistently encoun-
tering inattention, ameliorating the impact of unrespon-
siveness from a specific listener. Yet other audiences
may not always be available, and consistent lack of sup-
port for some stories is likely to affect self-views and the
life story over time.
Turning to the emotional aspects of storytelling, like
results from the parent-child studies, research suggests
that talking about negative past experiences is related
to autobiographical reasoning processes that are cen-
trally related to life-story development. For example,
Pasupathi (2003) found that, whereas positive emotion
does not change from the experience of an event to its
later retelling, people report less negative emotion in the
retelling than in the initial experience. Furthermore,
recent evidence suggests that writing or talking about
negative events (or storying them) is related to increased
well-being, and simply thinking about negative experi-
ence (or not storying them) leads to decreased well-being
(Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Dickerhoof, 2006). Furthermore,
thinking about positive events is related to increased
well-being but writing or talking about them is not
(Lyubomirsky et al., 2006). This suggests that the sto-
rying of negative, and not positive, events is particularly
important to well-being.
As mentioned in discussing the literature on children,
the apparent emotion regulation of negative events can
be viewed as important to developing part of the life
story. For example, one reason negative emotion may
lessen in telling stories (e.g., Pasupathi, 2003) is that
people are creating insights from their experiences, or
making meaning of their experiences, as we suggested
that Laura was doing in our fictional example. Indeed,
a large body of work shows a relation between negative
experience and meaning making (e.g., King, 2001; McAdams,
2006; McLean & Pratt, 2006; McLean & Thorne, 2003;
Pals, 2006; Thorne et al., 2004), suggesting that when
something disruptive happens people may be motivated
to resolve the negativity or disruption by narrating the
experience as provoking insight. Indeed, early results
indicate that people report more meaning-seeking goals
when talking about negative events than positive events
(Pasupathi, unpublished data
3). Those storytelling goals,
like listener behavior, may influence the degree of auto-
biographical reasoning in which people engage. In fact,
Pasupathi (2006) and McLean (2005) have both inde-
pendently shown that having talked about an experi-
ence in pursuit of understanding on one occasion is
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quent meanings in subsequent narratives of that experi-
ence. That is, having the goal of self-understanding in
storytelling results in making more connections between
the past and the self, and making these connections is
centrally related to the development of the life story
(e.g., Blagov & Singer, 2004; Bruner, 1990; McLean &
Pratt, 2006; McLean & Thorne, 2003). These results
also point directly to the idea that the process of autobi-
ographical reasoning occurs in the construction of situ-
ated stories, particularly stories of negative experiences.
Although autobiographical reasoning is clearly asso-
ciated with negative experiences, some readers might
wonder about the utility of positive stories in self-
development. The comparison of differentially valenced
stories is somewhat new to narrative research, but some
studies exist that shed light on this issue. In terms of
telling stories, McLean and Thorne (2006; see also
McLean, 2005; Pasupathi, 2006) suggested that more
positive stories are used socially for entertaining and
connecting with audiences and that, importantly, aspects
of the self are communicated in those moments of
shared fun. This kind of self-disclosure is safer than is
disclosure of more personal and negative stories
because the teller is less vulnerable and there is less of
a burden on the listener. Thus, these “lite” stories are
useful for connecting with others and communicating
parts of the self without great risk. In another area of
research, McLean and Pals (2007) have found that
life story high and low points are differentially used for
reminiscence functions. For example, compared to low
points, high points tend to be more often used for social
aspects of reminiscence, such as conversation and teach-
ing others. Similarly, Pals (2005) found that reasoning
about intimacy occurred in the narration of positive
events more often than in the narration of negative
events. Thus, the narration of positive events appears
to lie in a realm of self-development more focused on
relational domains.
Turning to storytelling goals and self-concept,
Sanitioso, Kunda, and Fong (1990) have shown that
people recall autobiographical memories consistent with
self-conceptions they want to hold at that time (due to
an experimental manipulation of the desirability of var-
ious traits). That is, people engage in motivated recruit-
ment of stories to change or maintain self-conceptions.
This relates to work on the working self-concept, which
is defined as a part of one’s self-concept that is more
susceptible to immediate influences such as goals (e.g.,
Conway, Singer, & Tagnini, 2004) but that can become
part of a more stable self-concept through repetition
(Kernis & Goldman, 2003). Therefore, if someone
repeatedly tells stories about being extraverted, then
one might begin to internalize those stories as part of
one’s self-concept. Situated storytelling should be a par-
ticularly important context for internalizing aspects of
self-concept because it is a social situation (Tice, 1992).
We note in comparing our model to that of Conway et al.
(2004) that these authors have done a clear and sophisti-
cated job of dealing with the dynamics of internal remem-
bering, but there is relatively little work that addresses the
social and interpersonal dynamics of remembering,
which is the aim of our model.
People’s immediate storytelling goals may also be
linked to the preferences of listeners. In creating stories
to please listeners, people create a certain kind of self in
that moment that may have a lasting impact on the self
(Pasupathi et al., 2007). For example, when people hold
the goal of entertaining rather than truth telling, they
adapt their narratives in ways that have lasting effects on
memory (Dudukovic, Marsh, & Tversky, 2004; McLean,
2005; Pasupathi, 2006; Pasupathi, in press). Furthermore,
although this explicit possibility has not been tested,
some research suggests that listeners’ responses shape
emotional and meaning-related aspects of stories. For
example, Pasupathi (2003) showed that listener agree-
ment was related to the lessening of negative emotion in
recalling a past negative event and that listener respon-
siveness was related to telling a more emotionally nega-
tive story, suggesting that listeners encourage certain
kinds of storytelling. However, whereas responsive lis-
teners may encourage talk about negative events, they
have preferences for the manner in which negative
events are storied. For example, Thorne et al. (2004)
found that listeners prefer self-defining stories about
gaining insight than about learning when one has done
wrong. Similarly, audiences do not like to hear stories
of vulnerability but of managing traumatic events
(Thorne & McLean, 2003). These findings are likely
related to the culture in which stories are told, which in
these studies was the United States, where redemption,
when stories turn from bad to good, is highly valued
(McAdams, 2006).
Although the focus of our model is on public situated
storytelling, for a complete discussion of our model, we
must address the issue of stories that are not told (see
Figure 1). Although the study of forgotten and untold
experiences is empirically difficult for obvious reasons,
we can draw some conclusions from the work we have
reviewed and from some of our own recent work.
However, it is important to recall from our introduction
that most of the stories people retain are shared, so we
are talking about a very small slice of one’s autobio-
graphical store in the discussion of untold stories. Based
on existing data, we argue that experiences that are for-
gotten are likely to be those that were not important,
not told, or told to a distracted listener (e.g., Pasupathi
& Hoyt, 2007; Pasupathi et al., 2007; Pasupathi &
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gotten are a bit more complex. Recently we have found
that untold memories are deemed, on average, less impor-
tant than are told memories, similar to our proposition
about forgotten memories (Pasupathi et al., 2007).
However, we have also found that untold stories are
more emotionally negative than are told stories, particu-
larly socially negative. We speculate that over the longer
term people are likely to forget most of what they do
not tell, particularly when the reason they are not telling
has to do with low importance. What people retain
are stories linked to negative social consequences, such
as shameful stories about personal transgressions, or
highly traumatic memories that create more vulnerable
telling contexts, such as sexual abuse (e.g. Fivush,
2004a; Thorne & McLean, 2003). We return to this
issue in addressing future directions for research with
this model.
In sum, all of the work reviewed thus far suggests that
creating a situated story affects both self-concept and the
life story and that storytelling may mediate the relation-
ship between the two. First, situated stories affect self-
concept when storytelling serves to express the event as
being highly self-relevant, as having changed the self in
some way, or as reinforcing existing self-views. Second,
creating a situated story can affect a participant’s subse-
quent stories; that is, when one constructs a particular
situated story in a specific context, that story influences
the degree of elaboration and the nature of the evalua-
tions one has about that event subsequently, similar to
the work on parent-child reminiscence. Furthermore,
when one is often in a position to engage in deeper auto-
biographical reasoning processes by constructing elabo-
rative stories, the life story will consequently be more
elaborated, vivid, and full, although this remains to be
tested empirically. The extant literature is clear on the
causal links between contextual factors such as listener
behavior and immediate goals and their impacts on sit-
uated stories. The evidence for long-term impacts is less
strong. Primarily, the parent-child reminiscence work
shows that the construction of situated stories has long-
term relations to narrative style and self-esteem, but it
has not examined the possibility for effects on the life
story. The young adult work, in contrast, tends to doc-
ument only short-term effects.
Our process model suggests other avenues for future
research. For example, researchers should begin to
examine the ways that situated stories change the self as
a process that is incremental, involving accumulated
constructions of the same or similarly themed stories
across time. That is, as a person tells a story over and
over to different audiences, the story is gradually shaped
into a part of the self. With repeated tellings, the image
of the self (either self-concept or the life story) that it
embodies is strengthened or de-emphasized. Whether
people engage in repeated tellings may depend quite a
bit on one’s listeners and whether the story is relevant
to one’s current goals. The final area that we review,
which provides evidence that stories affect the self, con-
cerns the effect of narrative construction on personality
development.
Can Stories Shape Personality on a Truly
Developmental Time Scale?
The work just reviewed documents the short-term
effects of storytelling on self-concept; however, there is
no research that directly tests long-term effects beyond
childhood. To provide evidence for this important impli-
cation of our process model, we turned to personality
research, where long-term relations with storytelling
have been well documented. Although the aspects of per-
sonality we address here (traits, ego development, goals)
go beyond a strict definition of self-concept, self-concept
and storytelling are intimately connected to these con-
structs, making personality centrally relevant to our
model. Methodologically, personality research often
involves testing one’s beliefs about the self, particularly
assessments that ask for conscious self-assessments, such
as traits and current goals. It is more important, how-
ever, that the self-concept has long been implicated con-
ceptually in theories of both stability and developmental
change in personality. For example, Caspi and Roberts
(1999) argued that, to the extent that traits may change
in adulthood, changes in how people conceptualize
themselves is one critical mechanism, with changes in
self-concept preceding more enduring patterns of think-
ing, feeling, and behaving. Another prominent theory of
development that has self-concept at its conceptual
center is ego development, a stage model of personality
maturity that assesses the complexity and psychological
sophistication of how people conceptualize the self in
relation to the world around them. To the extent that
there are relations between storytelling processes and
personality change, we see this as supportive and com-
pelling (albeit indirect) evidence for our assertion that
stories shape the self.
Ego development was originally conceptualized by
Loevinger (e.g., 1976) and is particularly important to
our model because it is not only a major part of the self
but it is also conceptualized as a process. Ego develop-
ment focuses on the level of complexity with which
people view the relation between themselves and the
world and how that complexity changes over time. As
such, ego-development captures not the content of self-
conceptions but the complexity and abstraction that
characterizes self-conceptions. Ego development is fairly
stable once adulthood is reached (see Cohn, 1998), and
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that experience, usually of a disruptive sort, prompts
revision of one’s self and world views (e.g., Helson,
1992; Helson & Roberts, 1994; Helson & Wink, 1987),
which brings us to storytelling as a mechanism for
change in ego development.
As parents may provide the contexts for children to
learn to elaborate and evaluate their past experiences,
ego development may provide the abilities for different
levels of autobiographical reasoning in adulthood. King
has found that one process by which ego levels may
increase is through certain narrative devices used to story
disruptive experiences (e.g., King, Scollon, Ramsey, &
Williams, 2000). She has looked explicitly at accommo-
dation, defined as altering existing cognitive schemas to
fit new information (Block, 1982). Specifically, accom-
modation within parents’ narratives about having a
child with Down’s syndrome predicted increases in ego
development over a 2-year period after controlling for
ego level at the time of the narrative telling, and this was
particularly the case for those who began at lower lev-
els (King et al., 2000). Thus, constructing stories about
a family challenge in which one adapts to new demands
is associated with becoming more cognitively complex
over time.
Pals (2006) took a long-term longitudinal approach to
the question of narrative processing and self-development.
She defined exploratory processing in narratives as
grappling with the complexity of an experience, explor-
ing its meaning, and actively interpreting its transfor-
mative impact. In examining 52-year-old women’s
narratives of difficult life experiences, she found that
exploratory processing of those difficult experiences
mediated the relation between self-reported coping
openness at age 21 and emotional maturity at age 61. In
other words, those who described themselves as open
and flexible in their approach to experiences in early
adulthood told more exploratory stories about difficult
events in midlife and subsequently showed more emo-
tional maturity, which is also one sign of ego develop-
ment (Loevinger, 1976).
With respect to changes in personality traits, there is
only a small amount of suggestive evidence available at
this point. For example, in Pals’ (2006) study, women
whose stories of difficult experiences showed coherent
resolution at age 52 increased on ego resiliency from
age 21 to age 52. Similarly, Sutin and Robins (2005)
showed that affective and motivational qualities of
3rd-year college students’ self-defining memories were
predictive of change in traits from the 1st to the 4th
year of college. For example, achievement motivation
expressed within memory narratives was predictive of
an increase in conscientiousness. In both of these
studies, it is impossible to determine whether narrative
characteristics caused trait change, but the association is
intriguing and warrants further investigation. As Sutin
and Robins argued, such findings suggest how situated
stories, which reflect the social-cognitive processes of
memory encoding and recall, may constitute mecha-
nisms of personality change.
Sutin and Robins (2005) also found continuity in
motives in self-defining memories over time, and they
suggested that the mechanism for that continuity might
be a reciprocal interaction between motives and stories.
For example, people may recall memories because of
their motives but that recall may also reinforce these
motives. The same process may also work for traits.
In this way, aspects of personalities may serve as an
overarching guide for narrative construction, but nar-
rative construction may also serve to maintain or alter
personality.
Although there are few longitudinal studies that
explicitly examine the potential for stories to shape per-
sonality, the few studies that do exist suggest that nar-
rative processes may have a role in shaping some aspects
of personality. First, narratives may themselves act as
forces for changing personality; second, narratives may
mediate links between personality at one point in
adulthood and subsequent change in personality. This
latter idea is important for considering narratives as an
engine for both stability and change. At a broader level
of analysis, it is important to recognize that people
have profoundly different ways of organizing and pro-
cessing experience. These ways of organizing experi-
ence reflect personality traits as well as goals, schemas,
and differences in cognitive orientations, such as ego
development. These different patterns of organization
should be directly related to how people construct and
tell stories about themselves, how they engage in auto-
biographical reasoning, and how others react to their
stories.
Having documented the potential for stories to shape
selves, we turn to the other arrow in our process model
because stories are also influenced by enduring charac-
teristics that storytellers bring to their creation.
THE SELF AFFECTS THE CONSTRUCTION
OF SITUATED STORIES
There is a wealth of evidence that people bring
enduring aspects of themselves to the creation of situ-
ated stories, which we briefly review. We start with con-
nections between trait levels of personality as a result
of the marked stability of traits in adulthood and the
assumption that traits are partly heritable and, thus,
precede experience (Costa & McCrae, 1994; Roberts &
DelVecchio, 2000).
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Personality traits are linked to basic emotional and
evaluative qualities of narratives. For example, neurotic
individuals construct more negatively toned and linguis-
tically negative narratives (McAdams et al., 2004; Pals,
2004; Pennebaker & King, 1999). In contrast, people
who are agreeable, open to experience, and optimistic
tell more positively toned and linguistically positive
narratives (McAdams et al., 2004; McLean & Pratt,
2006; Pals, 2004; Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, Allard, &
Alisat, 2006).
Traits are also related to the structural and interpretive
qualities of narratives. For example, openness to experi-
ence is associated with creating more structurally com-
plex narratives (McAdams et al., 2004). Similarly, Pals
(2006) found that coping openness was associated with
high levels of exploratory processing within narratives.
Those who are open to experience, more extraverted, and
less neurotic are more likely to interpret the past as bring-
ing about growth than are those who score lower on
these dimensions (Bauer, McAdams, & Sakeda, 2005; see
also McLean & Fournier, 2007).
In terms of more contextually oriented approaches,
McLean and Pasupathi (2006) recently showed that
more extraverted individuals tell personal stories more
often, especially in situations involving the mutual shar-
ing of the past. Thus, traits are also related to whether
and how often narratives are shared and created socially,
affecting the frequency of constructing situated stories.
Moreover, in this particular case, narratives might again
mediate between a trait (extraversion) and outcomes,
such as social network size, because the sharing of per-
sonally important stories in reciprocated exchanges is a
means for creating intimate connections with others
(Alea & Bluck, 2003).
Enduring motives and goals are also related to the
construction, recall, and organization of stories. Agency
and communion are the most well studied motives, and
predictably, agentic and communal people tend to report
motive-congruent narratives across multiple methods,
age groups, and types of narrative elicitations (e.g.,
McAdams, 1982, 1985; Woike, 1995). As mentioned
previously, such findings suggest that people’s enduring
goals or motives shape their situated stories, and those
stories then in turn provide for continuity in such goals
and motives over time (see also Moffitt & Singer, 1994;
Sutin and Robins, 2005; Thorne, Cutting, & Skaw,
1998). Finally, a large body of work from experimental
social and cognitive psychology supports the idea that
goals play a causal role in shaping situated stories (e.g.,
Dudukovic et al., 2004; McGregor & Holmes, 1999;
Tversky & Marsh, 2000).
The life story itself may also reveal how selves shape
stories because already established themes of one’s life
story may influence situated stories (Singer & Blagov,
2004). For example, if one has a consistent pattern of
redemption in one’s life story, a new and negative expe-
rience may likely become a situated story of redemp-
tion, as in Laura’s story with which we began. Indeed,
Singer and Blagov (2004) suggested that the life story
serves as an overarching guide in the process of story
development.
Although these findings are not new—nor is it surpris-
ing to find continuity in people’s voices for telling their
own stories—they point to the ways that situated stories
can reflect but also maintain and reinforce those enduring
characteristics. For example, motives, such as agency and
communion, and traits are fairly stable across adulthood
but this does not mean that stories are irrelevant to under-
standing these aspects of personality. Rather, stories may
help people understand why this stability exists, because
they may be an important mechanism for reinforcing this
stability. Moreover, when situated stories are constructed
in conversation, that repetition is coupled with social
reinforcement (see also Baumeister & Newman, 1994;
Pasupathi, 2001; Tice, 1992).
THE PRODUCTION AND IMPACT
OF SITUATED STORIES
By now we hope to have convinced our readers that
stories and selves are reciprocally related in important
ways. We now discuss the kinds of stories that researchers
should privilege in their studies, in terms of the stories
that are most likely to be produced and the stories that
are most likely to have a long-term impact on the self.
We propose that both production and impact of situ-
ated stories are affected by the kind of experience one
has. Long-term impact is also further related to speaker
goals, listener behavior, and autobiographical reasoning
processes.
Certain characteristics of experience appear to
make that experience more likely to be storied, and the
clearest marker of what makes a good story and what
makes a memorable story is a disruptive or unresolved
experience (Labov & Waletzky, 1967; Zeigarnik,
1935). Experiences that challenge one’s sense of self
(Pals, 2006), that are emotionally disruptive (Rimé
et al., 1991), or that are self-defining (Singer &
Salovey, 1993; Thorne, 2000) all create the starting
ingredients for a situated story to be produced. One
reason that such disruptive events are important is that
disruption actually makes a good story (Labov &
Waletzky, 1967). As many masters of the literary tra-
dition make clear in the topics of their books, it is dif-
ficult to tell stories about good things, such as happy
marriages (e.g., Updike, 1960). In other words, a story
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make stories tellable. Furthermore, once a problem
emerges, narrative is the process used to make sense of
the problem; narrative is the process by which humans
are able to render the uncanonical (i.e., experience)
canonical (i.e., story) (Bruner, 1990).
People do not only tell stories about negative experi-
ences because they make good stories, however, but also
because these stories are at the heart of autobiographical
reasoning processes. In discussing parent-child reminis-
cence, we emphasized research showing that talk about
negative experience is related to self-esteem and self-
concept. In discussing emerging and young adulthood, we
emphasized that the events from which people draw mean-
ing and engage in autobiographical reasoning processes
are those that are negative. Finally, in discussing person-
ality change, we focused on the importance of reasoning
about negative events. Thus, these negative events are
privileged for their story qualities as well as for their
relevance to the development of self-concept and self-
understanding.
Turning to the impact of these stories for later inte-
gration into the self, or story maintenance, we propose
that situated stories can provide incremental support for
one’s self-concept, and some of those stories will also be
selected into the life story. Again, we see the dynamic
relation between these two aspects of self and how at
some points they work in tandem instead of operating as
distinct outcomes. Specifically, events that are more likely
to be storied and told, that are told repeatedly, and that
contain personal meaning should all be more likely to
have an impact on self-concept and the life story than do
stories that do not contain such characteristics.
The characteristics of what makes an experience likely
to be storied are also related to telling that story repeat-
edly; if it made a good story once, it is likely to do so
again. Repeated story tellings play a crucial role in the
development of both self-concept and the life story
because stories that are told more frequently should reflect
enduring motives or themes of one’s life (Moffitt &
Singer, 1994) and should also be acceptable to one’s audi-
ences. If not, they would either not be told or would be
constructed into a more acceptable story (e.g., Pasupathi
et al., 2007; Thorne & McLean, 2003). Consequently,
stories that represent enduring aspects of one’s self and
that hold currency one's self and one’s audiences are those
that are most likely to be told and retold.
Characteristics of events that make an experience
more likely to be storied and told repeatedly also make it
more likely to become part of the life story, perhaps
because of the opportunity such experiences afford for
meaning-making. For example, stories about disruptive
experiences are more likely to contain special characteris-
tics of well-developed life stories, such as the presence of
self-event connections (Pasupathi & Mansour, 2006),
exploratory processing (Pals, 2006), or life lessons or
insights (McLean, 2005; McLean & Pratt, 2006; McLean
& Thorne, 2003; Thorne et al., 2004). These narrative
characteristics should be especially important for selec-
tion into the life story.
THE CULTURAL CONTEXT OF
SITUATED STORIES
Our process model is situated within a cultural
framework, given that the development of the life story
presupposes acceptance from both proximal audiences
and the culture at large. Despite some recent strong
empirical work, there is a deficit in our knowledge of
the relation between narrative and culture, relative to
research on other aspects of narrative, and there is far
less research on cultures other than Western-American
culture. Our goal is for this process model to be applied
to studies of different groups because culture is the over-
arching framework in which self-construction occurs
(see Figure 1) and any situated story should reflect cul-
tural influences on the teller and on the storytelling con-
text. However, future research remains to be done to
determine if the configuration of experience and the func-
tion of stories is the same across cultures (see Wang &
Brockmeier, 2002, for a discussion).
To emphasize how culture may be important to sto-
rytelling, we return to Laura’s story of the loss of her
mother. This story is an example of what McAdams
(2006) has called “a cultural narrative of redemption,”
which is highly valued in American storytelling prac-
tices. In thinking about how Laura formed this story, it
is possible that her original audiences may have turned
her toward redemption as a possible motif for her story.
Because redemption reflects the specific values of one
culture, Laura’s story will contrast in important respects
with someone who grew up in a different culture. For
example, Wang (e.g., 2001, 2004) has argued that East
Asian and Western cultures differ on several characteris-
tics that would make Laura’s story less likely to emerge
in China, such as the propensity for Chinese partici-
pants to report more script-like narratives with fewer
details, less emphasis on the self, and more emphasis on
morality than their American counterparts (e.g., Wang
& Conway, 2004). Indeed, Wang and colleagues (Wang
& Brockmeier, 2002) suggested that the function of
narrative practices for Westerners is to create a self-
history for the purpose of self-continuity, whereas the
function of such practices for Chinese individuals is to
develop connectedness with others and adherence to
moral guidelines. Speculatively, an Asian Laura might
tell a different story about her mother’s death, with
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personal growth and more emphasis on her new respon-
sibilities in the family.
Cultural differences have also been seen in studies
focused on socioeconomic class rather than ethnicity or
country of origin per se. Miller and her colleagues (e.g.,
Wiley, Rose, Burger, & Miller, 1998) have examined
how working- and middle-class mothers use narrative
for socialization practices. First, working-class families
engage in more storytelling than do their middle-class
counterparts, suggesting that the opportunities afforded by
storytelling to shape selves may differ by culture. Findings
also suggest that mothers from both socioeconomic classes
were socializing a valued trait in the American culture from
which the sample was drawn, autonomy, but through dif-
ferent mechanisms. For example, working-class mothers
appeared to view autonomy as something that is earned
and thus they engaged in more challenging narrative
practices with their children (see also Heath, 1983),
whereas middle-class mothers saw autonomy as a gift to
be bestowed on their children, allowing more leeway in
their children’s narrative accounts. The authors inter-
preted these different ways of socializing autonomy
as reflecting beliefs about the place of each group in
society. For example, teaching children of working-class
families that they must earn their rights may be an adap-
tive strategy. Overall, both country of origin and social
class appear to affect the kinds of stories one tells, and
it appears that these stories are socialized in culture-
specific ways in childhood. How these cultural differ-
ences map on to the construction of life stories in adult-
hood is an exciting avenue for researchers to explore.
We suggest that one way researchers might continue to
explore cultural differences in narrative construction is to
examine master narratives and how people use them and
respond to them. Researchers have coined the term master
narrative to address how people engage in discourse under
the umbrella of the norms and expectations of a given cul-
ture (Bamberg, 2004b; Boje, 1991; Schiffrin, 1996;
Thorne & McLean, 2003). Redemptive sequences can be
viewed as one such narrative, but there are others. Boje
(1991) argued the master narratives are tools for sense
making; they help people understand how they are to
behave and interpret their experience. It is important that
cultures embody different expectations for different
members, such as men and women. For example, Thorne
and McLean (2003) discussed a master narrative of care
and concern—of relations—employed by women (see also
Gilligan, 1982) and of stoicism and bravery employed by
men in response to life-threatening situations. Laura’s
choice of a relational event as a landmark in her life story
is thus consistent with feminine master narratives.
How master narratives are negotiated between
those with power differentials in society is particularly
important in considering the role of culture and narration.
For example, Michaels (1991) provided an account of
the dismantling of a young African American girl’s nar-
rative style by her Caucasian and well-meaning teacher.
The dismantling occurred for the style and content of
narrative that the girl used and the yearlong ethnog-
raphy shows how part of her narrative style, part of
her self, was silenced in the classroom. The consequence
of socialization into the dominant master narrative is
only beginning to be explored by researchers interested
in self. Clearly, however, engaging in storytelling to any
extent involves voicing and silencing some aspects of self
in response to greater cultural norms, listener demands,
or personal motivations (Fivush, 2004a; see also Bamberg,
2004a, for a discussion of counternarratives). Master
narratives are an interesting venue for future research
on situated storytelling because researchers cannot only
examine the norms and expectations about certain cul-
tures that are revealed by such narratives but can also
better understand the dynamics between personal sto-
ries and the broader cultural narratives under which
people learn to construct these stories.
FROM STORY TO SELF: NEW DIRECTIONS
FOR RESEARCH
Thus far, we hope to have convinced the reader that
storytelling is related to both the development and main-
tenance of the self. However, at this point we believe
there are several important questions to be raised. First,
extant evidence consists overwhelmingly of correla-
tional data, so we suggest that there are important lon-
gitudinal and experimental studies to be done to test the
causal pathways that we have articulated to compre-
hensively test our model. Second, we return to the issue
of untold stories.
In terms of the first issue, we suggest that long-term
process relations between self-concept and narratives
need to be unequivocally established. For example, our
model would predict that self-esteem would change
over time because of the way one narrates experience
and the kind of listener one has. Both of these aspects of
a conversation can be manipulated to test for causal
pathways by building on prior work that has success-
fully manipulated listener behavior and by manipulating
the goal of telling, for example, to elicit different kinds
of narration from the speaker. Furthermore, extending
some of the childhood work to adults and testing some
adult correlational work, comparing people who are
encouraged to engage in more elaborative reminiscing to
a control group in terms of outcomes in self-development,
are also important studies to be done. Finally, the cumu-
lative practice of telling stories in a certain way to certain
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involves using a multiwave longitudinal design. In short,
explicitly establishing how change in aspects of self-con-
cept and the life story are mediated by different kinds of
storytelling is crucial in long-term designs.
The second issue of untold and fragmented stories is
important for future research to address, but as we
mentioned earlier, this is an empirically challenging area
of study given that any story told in the lab is being
told. Instead of specific empirical plans, we raise the-
oretical issues here to drive the conceptual planning
of future studies. The first question is whether untold
and told stories are similarly situated. We argue that
the primary difference between constructing stories pri-
vately and publicly is that public storytelling opens the
self up to social shaping because of the real reactions of
and interactions with live people. More specifically, the
social telling of situated stories may make the impact of
the story on the self stronger than untold story con-
struction as a result of social reinforcements that occur
only when publicly telling one’s story (e.g., Tice, 1992).
That is, stories may be situated in one’s mind (such as
when one plans to tell a story), but the actual storying
involves social processes that are absent or less strong
in the imagined scenario. Nevertheless, private storying
should also shape the self in social ways because of
cultural expectations of stories or imagined audiences,
for example, but these differences are contingent on
how people imagine their social worlds, not how they
actually are.
We note here that the scope of untold experiences is
broad and may include experiences that are forgotten
because they are unimportant, and experiences that
people story for themselves but don’t want to disclose,
such as suppressed stories or experiences people are
unwilling to face. Although these issues are beyond the
scope of this article, they are clearly important for
researchers to investigate. We reiterate that most of
what people story is told (Pasupathi et al., 2007), at
least in relatively healthy populations, so we are not
addressing a large piece of the puzzle of storied self-
development in talking about untold stories.
In raising issues for future research on untold stories,
there are three kinds of storying processes that need to
be investigated: how stories that are important and not
told fit into the self, particularly those that are socially
negative; how partially told or fragmented stories fit
into the self; and on a related note, how stories that are
told differently in different contexts fit into the self. We
find some guidance on these questions from social psy-
chological literature, to which we now turn.
As mentioned earlier, our recent research suggests
that people are less likely to disclose socially negative
events (Pasupathi et al., 2007). In terms of the conse-
quences that this lack of disclosure has for the self, we
suggest that whereas socially negative stories are likely
to have an effect on the self through emotional experi-
ence or behavior (see Fivush, 2004a), not being able to
tell these kinds of stories means that they do not have the
opportunity to be fully integrated into the self. Indeed,
finding a greater usage of past tense, or distance, in dis-
closed events suggests that disclosed events “are more
integrated into a person’s sense of history” (Pasupathi,
in press, p. 17). Along with Fivush (2004b), we view the
opportunity to voice stories as a central process for the
highest level of self-integration. This is because people
not only need social validation for themselves and their
stories, but people also need personal validation, and
giving voice to their stories is a way of providing per-
sonal validation of the self, a way of owning experience
(Fivush, 2001). Of course, this claim about self-integration
is one to be addressed in future studies not only in terms
of its validity but also in terms of how much voicing
is necessary for integration and in what manner. For
example, more clinically oriented research suggests that in
some populations (e.g., those with posttraumatic stress
disorder and manifestations of hyper arousal symptoms)
the storying of traumatic events is not adaptive (e.g.,
Pennebaker, & Seagal, 1999; Sijbrandij, Olff, Reitsma,
Carlier, & Gersons, 2006). Similarly, research on repres-
sors shows that in their recall of negative emotional expe-
riences they remember a disproportionate number of
over-general self-defining memories (e.g., Blagov &
Singer, 2004; Davis, 1987; Davis & Schwartz, 1987).
Thus, if self-development occurs through telling stories
about negative emotional events, our model would pre-
dict that these populations might be limited in terms of
narrative self-development. As such, theories of narrative
should take into account the consequences of processing
such emotionally laden material for different groups.
Extending the issue of voicing and silencing, we see
this as somewhat analogous to chameleon effects, which
manifest as moderated self-presentations, often in ways
that self-enhance (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Leary
et al., 1994; Paulhus, 1998; Schlenker, 2003). Interest-
ingly, some have suggested that in comfortable settings
people have scripts for how to act that they can more
automatically call on (e.g., Leary et al., 1994), and we
argue that the same might be true for stories in that
people have some script-like stories to fulfill certain con-
textual demands (e.g., the story of how you met your
spouse for the cocktail party circuit). This might also
include the fragmenting of stories, that is, the voicing of
some details and the silencing of others to fit the context.
This discussion of untold stories also needs to be linked
to theorizing and research on public and private selves.
The public self manifests as cognition or knowledge of
the self as a social object and is more influenced by
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internalized, ruminative, or reflective behavior about
more personal aspects of the self and is more influenced
by personal demands (e.g., Carver, 2003). Along with
others (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1987; Leary, 2006), we
view these two aspects of self not as separate or distinct
parts of the self but as engaged in a dynamic interaction;
one cannot exist without the other. Telling stories
involves the management of both the public and private
self because both can be revised or maintained through
storytelling. Clearly, responses to one’s stories can change
how one later tells other stories, affecting the public self
(e.g., Pasupathi & Rich, 2005; Thorne & McLean,
2003). We also suggest that the private self is given the
opportunity to develop through storytelling in two ways.
First, reactions to stories can cause internal revision or
confirmation of one’s stories (e.g., Leary, Terdal, &
Downs, 1995; see also Pasupathi & Rich, 2005). Second,
reactions can allow one to create (or not create) self-con-
cept socially (e.g., Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985;
Pasupathi & Rich, 2005). However, to fully understand
the self, as researchers we need to be mindful of the com-
plexity of story fragmentation and work hard to under-
stand all of the stories that our participants have in all of
the ways that they have them (Pasupathi, in press). It is
only when we understand how the many stories and their
derivatives fit together that we can more equivocally say
what researchers should focus on in studying story and
self. Overall, there is a great amount of work to be done
to further understand how untold and partially told sto-
ries fit into self-concept and the life story. Lacking more
data, we can only offer these ideas and hope that others
will be inspired to take on this important and interesting,
but also quite challenging, path of empirical investigation.
Returning to Rukeyser’s (1968) words with which
we started, stories are the substance of the self. Along
with many other researchers and theorists who see the
value of stories, we hope that this model will encourage
others to pay attention to stories and their role in self-
development. Specifically, we suggest that research will
advance not only by examining the processes of self-
change from the construction of situated stories that we
have detailed but also other elements of our process model,
such as the impact of situated stories for self-stability, the
specific characteristics and processes that turn experiences
into stories, and the aspects of persons that color experi-
ence and, consequently, stories. To witness the construc-
tion of situated stories is to understand the dynamic
development of the self. Indeed, sharing stories is the mech-
anism through which people become selves.
NOTES
1. We also note Alea and Bluck’s (2003) model of the social function
of autobiographical memory has relevance here. However, we are
proposing a process model of self-development, and we do not distin-
guish between self and social functions as separate entities (see also
McLean, 2005; Nelson, 2003). Their model, however, is a useful start-
ing point for thinking about models of the social sharing of autobio-
graphical memory from which we draw.
2. We note that the definition of stories has wide variation between
studies. We focus, most broadly, on stories that are about the personal
past and are told with some sort of point in mind (e.g., Labov &
Waletzky, 1967).
3. An analysis of the same data presented in Pasupathi (2003) com-
pares the degree to which people retold the event to seek insight from
it as a function of the valence of the experience. The results show that
negative events were significantly more likely than were positive events
to be told for insight-seeking purposes.
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